

Naval War College Review

Volume 22
Number 7 *September*

Article 17

1969

Power in the Kremlin

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Recommended Citation

Abromitis, W. (1969) "Power in the Kremlin," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 22 : No. 7 , Article 17.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol22/iss7/17>

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120 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

law of international order, a prudent role of reciprocal safety," which, by its simplicity, minimizes uncertainty and miscalculation. He relates the major international events of the last quarter century to this theme, with emphasis on the most significant events of recent years, the Vietnamese war and the Middle East crises.

It is clear that Professor Rostow is a firm supporter of the policies followed by the Johnson administration; however, he avoids the title of "apologist" for those policies—just barely. He presents them as simply the logical result of continued adherence to a longstanding policy of proven worth—one which comprises the only foreign policy for America if international peace and order is to be attained. Professor Rostow claims that the continuing debate over our Vietnam policy is actually a screen for the real debate over whether the United States should have a foreign policy at all and to what extent force should be used in carrying it out: Are American interests worldwide, after all, or should they be confined to the small circle of industrialized and friendly nations? He believes the idea advanced by the debaters that the law can prevail without force is illusory and that "in international society, law is inconceivable without the rational and agreed control of force."

The book, concise and clearly written, contains a valuable outline of the basic themes fundamental to the continuing debate on American foreign policy. It is "must" reading for all who are concerned with the development of foreign policy. Professor Rostow's premises are brilliantly lucid, and the simplicity of his logic is obviously intended to confound the McCarthyite elements of modern American life; they will have a difficult time refuting his position short of relying on flashing but unsubstantive hyperbole. This volume should be read now, in order to provide basic background information on which

to have an appraisal of foreign policy developments which the new administration might propose. If Professor Rostow is correct, the American people must unreservedly accept the fact of their Great Power status and their obligation to exercise that power in concert with the other major powers of the world. President Nixon, as their agent, will have little practical choice but to continue the basic policy of all Presidents since 1945 and to suffer the same excoriation by the outspoken minority that has been the fate of all four of his predecessors in this new era of American international involvement.

J.F. McNULTY
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Tatu, Michel. *Power in the Kremlin*. New York: Viking Press, 1968. 570p.

Michel Tatu, self-appointed French Kremlinologist, using the Soviet press as his main source of information, reconstructs the struggle for power in the Kremlin—Khrushchev to Kosygin. Having been in Russia during Khrushchev's regime, the author researched the reported movements, actions, and published words of the top dozen or so political figures in the U.S.S.R. to evaluate their effect upon the political life of Nikita S. Khrushchev. One is impressed, as he reads this book, with the manipulative ability required of any man who rules in the Kremlin. This man must be capable of actively directing the country's foreign policy, domestic economy, ideological development, and the international Communist movement while, at the same time, protecting himself from his domestic and foreign political enemies. The downfall of Khrushchev can be traced to an overestimation of his personal popularity, an underestimation of his political adversaries, and his miscalculations in handling several of the sensitive situations and issues that confronted him during his rule. The author explores specific issues that

PROFESSIONAL READING 121

affected the fate of Khrushchev: the United States U-2 incident, the de-Stalinization program, the ideological conflict with the Communist Party, the peaceful coexistence policy, the Cuban missile crisis, the allocation of national resources, the domestic economy, and the violations of the principle of collective leadership. M. Tau's portrayal of N.S. Khrushchev is that of a man dedicated to providing greater personal freedom and consumer goods for his people; living in peaceful coexistence with the West; and competing with the non-Communist world on a political, ideological, and economic basis. However, the events of the day and the political pressures from without and within forced him to deviate greatly

from these policies and eventually to surrender his political power to his successors.

This book is not for the uninitiated, as the author discusses in some depth the political and economic structures and the interwoven philosophies and issues which faced Khrushchev. Without the background knowledge of these structures of the Soviet Union, the student would be hard pressed to understand the motivating forces in much of the political interaction which took place. It is recommended for those students who are interested in studying the Soviet leadership in greater depth.

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Knowledge of Naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times and on the by . . .

Pericles, fl 460 B.C.